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Abstract
How can firms mitigate the impact of moral violations on consumer evaluations? This question has pervaded the business 
ethics literature. Though prior research has identified decoupling as a moral reasoning strategy where consumers separate 
moral judgments from evaluations (avoiding moral compromise and dissonance), it is unclear what motivates individuals 
to decouple. It is the objective of this research to explore regulatory focus theory (i.e., a framework examining consumer 
mindsets as prevention or promotion orientated) as a motivating factor for moral decoupling. Three experiments are under-
taken. Study one demonstrates that with a prevention mindset (e.g., analytical thinking) as opposed to promotion mindset 
(e.g., feeling-based thinking), moral decoupling can be achieved. Specifically, those in a prevention mindset report more 
favorable evaluations when information about a violation explicitly lowers (vs. does not lower) consequences of moral 
violations. However, when the violation is related to the business functionality of the brand, those in a prevention (vs. 
promotion) mindset report less favorable evaluations, except when consequences are lowered. This indicates an inability to 
decouple (studies 2–3), and results in negative emotions (study 3). The research shows that inability to decouple for those 
in a prevention mindset leads to negative emotions, lowering evaluations. These results contribute to the moral reasoning 
literature by linking regulatory focus to decoupling strategies. Further, the research bridges literature on norm activation, 
moral foundation, regulatory focus, and moral decoupling to reconcile theoretical differences in judgment styles. Implica-
tions for businesses and brands are discussed.
Keywords Moral reasoning · Moral decoupling · Moral foundations · Regulatory focus · Political brands · Consumer 
judgment
Introduction
People regularly encounter news, especially negative news, 
about brands and businesses (Diermeier 2012; Trump 
2014). Moral violations, a prime example of negative news, 
refer to actions deemed unacceptable with regard to gener-
ally accepted norms of behavior (Reynolds 2006; Treviño 
et al. 2006). These violations are normally organized in 
peoples’ minds by assigning a victim role to the consum-
ers (or society) and a perpetrator role to the brand (Romani 
et al. 2015). While some instances of brand moral viola-
tions have resulted in purchase boycotts or unfavorable 
evaluations (e.g., protests against Burberry for using haz-
ardous chemicals), other instances exist where no or mixed 
evaluations occurred. For example, in December 2017, 
nearly “no one” deemed Nike as negative. Yet, after Nike 
used Kaepernick (i.e., an athlete who refused to stand for 
the national anthem), around 17% of people viewed Nike 
negatively (Street-Porter 2018). Kaepernick might not have 
caused this change in perceptions, but his actions could have 
been a contributing factor. As a political brand, Bill Clinton 
had an extramarital affair and was impeached, though was 
elected to a second presidential term. More recently, the Chi-
nese firm Huawei, a global leader in the manufacturing of 
mobile phone network equipment, has stirred much debate 
about espionage. Several companies and firms have blocked 
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Huawei while the UK argues that these issues can be miti-
gated (Huawei 2019). As these examples imply, moral viola-
tions force people and business partners to decide whether or 
not they will continue relationships with transgressors. What 
explains such differences in reactions to moral violations?
The morality literature identifies moral reasoning strat-
egies that people use to allay negative moral judgment, 
including moral rationalization (Mazar et al. 2008; Paharia 
and Deshpande 2009; Shu et al. 2011) and moral decou-
pling (Bhattacharjee et  al. 2012). Moral rationalization 
occurs when people support a transgressor by interpreting 
the immoral action as less immoral (e.g., the moral violation 
is unimportant). Decoupling, though, dissociates immoral 
judgments from job-related performance judgments (e.g., his 
actions were immoral but his athletic performance is posi-
tive). Because all moral judgments link closely to the self-
concept, people try to maintain a positive view of themselves 
in terms of their moral standards. As such, rationalizing 
immoral behavior to maintain support for the transgressor 
could result in compromising one’s moral standards, which 
yields tension (Thøgersen 2004). Moral decoupling, though, 
feels better than rationalization (Bhattacharjee et al. 2012) 
and prevents dissonance (Lee et al. 2016).
It is still unclear whether decoupling occurs. Some 
researchers suggest decoupling is less likely given the lack of 
well-supported empirical evidence (e.g., Stellar and Willer 
2018). Others posit that decoupling occurs when consumers 
identify more strongly with the business (i.e., brand love, 
self-brand connection, etc.; Lee et al. 2015) or when the 
immoral act is unrelated to job performance (e.g., perfor-
mance-enhancing drugs as a political figure versus a cyclist; 
Lee and Kwak 2016). Still, decoupling may be harder to 
trigger in situations where performance is subjective, such as 
politics (Bhattacharjee et al. 2012). As such, more research 
is needed (e.g., Bhattacharya and Elsbach 2002; Hoegg and 
Lewis 2011) to better understand decoupling. Specifically, 
within the business ethics literature, extant research fails to 
provide an explanation for who engages in decoupling and 
when it occurs. Moreover, it is unclear how consequences 
of violations impact decoupling. In other words, individual 
and contextual factors may motivate individuals to decou-
ple. The present research focuses on regulatory focus as a 
motivational approach to explain how people process and 
interpret immorality.
We hypothesize that moral judgments stem from consum-
ers’ motivation to process information, such as that empha-
sized by regulatory focus theory. This theory is able to explain 
differences in decision-making and judgment, activated by a 
promotion (i.e., pursues goals, uses feelings and emotions) or 
prevention (i.e., avoids losses, uses cognitions, and risk evalu-
ations) mindset (Higgins 1997, 1998; Roy and Phau 2014). 
Under regulatory focus theory, we argue that promotion-
focused consumers cannot separate moral judgments from 
other information, such as consequences of the moral viola-
tion. This is consistent with research demonstrating that people 
often disregard factual information about the consequences of 
the violation, relying on emotion and intuition (Bloom 2013; 
Haidt 2001). We also predict that those in a prevention mindset 
can separate moral judgments from evaluations, such as when 
a moral violator reduces consequences to others resulting in 
less-negative moral judgments. This argument, though con-
trary to Haidt (2001) and others, is in line with other moral-
ity theorists (e.g., Schwartz 1977), suggesting that negative 
evaluations follow moral violations when consequences exist.
In sum, we argue that those in a prevention (vs. promotion) 
mindset are more likely to use moral decoupling. However, in 
line with moral decoupling literature, we argue that in a pre-
vention mindset, it should be more difficult to separate moral 
judgments from performance judgments when a transgression 
is directly related to job performance (e.g., taking steroids as 
a cyclist). Violations related (vs. unrelated) to performance 
should serve as a boundary condition. Thus, the primary 
objective of this research is to answer the following questions. 
Does regulatory focus influence how consequences of moral 
violations determine consumer evaluations? Are moral viola-
tions related to job performance judged differently? And, do 
negative emotions explain the tensions experienced in moral 
reasoning?
To that end, three experiments support our hypotheses that 
moral violations are more damaging when individuals have a 
promotion (vs. prevention) mindset, unless the violation relates 
to the transgressor’s job performance (studies 1–3). Moreover, 
moral violations related to job performance are more negative 
when individuals have a prevention (vs. promotion) mind-
set and potential consequences to the transgressor are high 
(studies 2–3). Lastly, negative emotions underlie these effects 
(study 3), supporting regulatory focus as motivating moral 
decoupling. This research offers several noteworthy find-
ings. First, it identifies regulatory focus theory as a relevant 
motivational theory, which can lead to or hinder decoupling 
strategies. Second, the research reconciles prior theorizing on 
morality literature, demonstrating that some consumers (i.e., 
those with a promotion mindset) use emotions to judge moral 
violations and are incapable of separating consequences of 
moral violations from brand evaluations (e.g., Haidt 2001). 
Though, others (i.e., those with a prevention mindset) integrate 
consequences in their judgments (e.g., Schwartz 1977). Lastly, 
we provide practical implications for businesses and brands.
Theoretical Background
Morality and Moral Foundations Theory
Morality, a significant foundation for people’s self-concepts, 
is a motivating force in society, which influences attitudes, 
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values, and purchase intentions (Weiss 1942). Moral sys-
tems are “inter-locking sets of values, practices, and evolved 
psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress 
or regulate selfishness and make social life possible” (Haidt 
2008, p. 70). The morality of a society is, thus, related to its 
social customs as being the right and wrong ways to act, as 
well as to the laws of the society which add legal prohibi-
tions and sanctions to many activities considered immoral 
(De George 1987). According to Walzer (1983), the morality 
of a society is gradually built up from the specific experi-
ences of the community in dealing with specific cases (i.e., 
judgments of actions).
Moral foundations theory was developed to explain how 
morals differ across cultures. The theory identifies six foun-
dations for human behavior and moral judgment (Graham 
et al. 2011), namely care (i.e., care for and protect others, 
avoid harm), fairness (i.e., justice for all, avoid treatment 
of inequality), liberty (i.e., freedom for all, avoid oppres-
sion), loyalty (i.e., patriotism and loyalty to groups which we 
belong, avoid selfishness), purity (i.e., respect for religious 
tradition, avoid degradation), and authority (i.e., acceptance 
of hierarchy, avoid disobedience; Haidt and Joseph 2004). 
The type of foundation violated determines the extent of 
negative judgment. Care, liberty, and fairness are individ-
ualizing, focused on protection and fair treatment of all. 
Though, loyalty, authority, and purity are binding, promot-
ing binding individuals to larger groups such as a family, 
nation, or religious organizations.
Moral Judgment and Reasoning
Deviation from societal customs and laws can also be 
explained by the Norm Activation Model (NAM; Schwartz 
1977), which includes three variables related to morality. 
The first, personal norms (PN), refers to feeling a moral obli-
gation to engage in or prevent behaviors (Schwartz and How-
ard 1981). The second variable relates to the awareness of 
negative consequences (AC) for others when acting immor-
ally. Third, ascription of responsibility (AR) pertains to the 
degree of felt responsibility for the negative consequences 
(i.e., whose fault it is when immorality leads to negative 
consequences). AC of immoral behavior results in AR (De 
Groot and Steg 2009). For example, when a politician sup-
posedly has an affair, people who believe that society will 
become more corrupt as a result will ascribe more respon-
sibility of the behavior to the politician (White et al. 2009). 
This is further evinced by studies showing that AC affects 
AR, and AR affects feelings related to PN (Steg et al. 2005).
Generally, moral judgments emerge when three causally 
interconnected components are present: norm violation, 
negative affect, and harm. Norm violations are negative 
and may prompt perceptions of harm that lead to negative 
affect (Schein and Gray 2018). And yet, people can engage 
in strategies to attenuate negative affect, such as moral 
rationalization, moral reasoning approaches that justify or 
excuse immoral actions to make them personally acceptable 
(Bandura 1999). Rationalization tends to focus on a person’s 
beliefs. For instance, individuals, when rationalizing, can 
redefine the harmful behavior, minimize the violator’s role 
in causing harm, blame the harmed, or minimize or distort 
harm caused by the violator. Employing these strategies, 
however, compromises one’s moral standards in order to 
condone immorality (Mazar et al. 2008; Paharia and Desh-
pande 2009; Shu et al. 2011).
Another strategy, less likely to result in compromise with 
the self-concept, includes moral decoupling, which separates 
immoral behavior from the performance of the transgres-
sor. This strategy works by altering the manner of viewing 
a moral action as associated with performance in a given 
domain. In a series of studies, Bhattacharjee et al. (2012) 
provided evidence that decoupling boosts brand support but 
also condemns the transgressor’s immorality. Thus, decou-
pling, compared to rationalization, feels easier to justify and 
results in predictable support and opposition of transgres-
sors. However, decoupling may be more difficult to employ 
when the immoral act is related to the transgressor’s job 
performance (Lee and Kwak 2016). Despite these significant 
insights, it is not yet clear if all individuals employ moral 
decoupling (as opposed to moral rationalization) when fac-
ing a moral judgment task, and if not, what individual or 
situational factors impact such decisions. For instance, it is 
not clear if the type of moral violation (i.e., moral founda-
tion type), the level of consequences of the moral violation, 
and the motivational ability of individuals to process moral 
violation information have an impact on moral decoupling.
Given the different information available regarding con-
sequences of moral violations and types of moral foundation 
violation, it is important to examine how people process 
this information. As such, we focus on the motivational 
dynamics underlying moral evaluations. Due to the subjec-
tive nature of political performance, we selected this con-
text to examine moral decoupling strategies as related to job 
performance in a more ambiguous situation (Bhattacharjee 
et al. 2012). This approach enables us to understand how 
people can separate consequences of a moral violation from 
individual conduct to mitigate negative judgments. Addi-
tionally, a political context enables critical evaluation of the 
role of awareness of moral violation consequences (AC) 
in shaping moral judgments (cf. De Groot and Steg 2009). 
Finally, it will aid in providing theoretically sound explana-
tions for how some people can disregard moral information 
when judging a brand, while others base their judgments on 
moral information.
In doing so, we focus on violations related to purity and 
authority foundations for several reasons. First, despite their 
differences, purity and authority-related moral issues are 
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consistent with scenarios politicians are frequently accused 
of violating (Diermeier 2012). As a case in point, consider 
the accusations against President Trump, mainly focusing on 
sexual relationships and obstruction of justice. Second, these 
two binding moral foundations have not been studied in mod-
ern research with respect to moral evaluations. Following a 
systematic review of extant research on immoral behaviors 
in top marketing journals, Komarova Loureiro et al. (2016) 
found no research examining authority and purity immoral 
behaviors, arguing that these moral foundations “have been 
virtually neglected” (p. 4). So, the present research fills a 
gap in the literature by examining the prescriptive nature 
of authority and purity moral violations (Janoff-Bulman 
et al. 2009). Third, since the consequences and the scope 
of impact of violations related to binding moral foundations 
go beyond the individual and his/her immediate circle and 
expand to the larger groups, organizations, and society (Gra-
ham et al. 2009), it is important to examine how violations 
are evaluated by members of the society. Such an approach 
is warranted given the fact that people are more willing to 
engage in deviant behavior if they are exposed to immorality, 
a phenomenon called moral spillover (Mullen and Nadler 
2008). A focus on purity and authority violations allows an 
empirical examination of these binding moral foundations 
in Western society. Fourth and relatedly, given prior argu-
ments suggesting that Western societies are less likely to 
emphasize adherence to binding moral foundations (Haidt 
and Joseph 2004; Shweder et al. 1997), the present research 
examines these claims in a political context, because politi-
cal actions affect society at large.
Regulatory Focus Theory and Morality Judgment
Regulatory focus is a higher-order motivational goal that 
activates different mindsets, influences the choice of infor-
mation used in decision-making, and accounts for conse-
quences in actions (Roy and Phau 2014). Specifically, regu-
latory focus theory argues that people have a promotion or 
prevention mindset (Higgins 1997, 1998). When experienc-
ing a prevention mindset, individuals focus on duties and 
obligations, look for safety, and minimize consequences in 
their decisions. In a promotion mindset, though, individu-
als are motivated to accomplish their hopes and dreams and 
improve their situation (Crowe and Higgins 1997; Higgins 
1997, 1998). Different mindsets guide information choice in 
judgment and decision-making, such as brand evaluations 
(Roy and Phau 2014).
Extant research shows that promotion and prevention 
mindsets prompt different mental approaches that result 
in different information processing styles (Wang and Lee 
2006). Neuroimaging research indicates that induction 
of a promotion mindset activates the frontal regions of 
the brain, while a prevention mindset activates posterior 
regions (Packer and Cunningham 2009). As a result, peo-
ple experiencing a promotion mindset employ abstract or 
relational information processing, while people in a pre-
vention mindset use concrete or item-specific information 
processing (Smith and Trope 2006; Roy and Phau 2014; 
Förster and Higgins 2005). While relational elaboration 
involves integration and abstraction and focuses on overall 
relationships among information elements, item-specific 
elaboration involves separate and context-specific evalua-
tion, focusing on each information element/attribute inde-
pendent of others (Zhu and Meyers-Levy 2007).
Given the processing styles activated, regulatory foci 
can influence judgments of moral violations and result 
in varying evaluations. For instance, following an item-
specific information processing, people in a prevention 
mindset are expected to assess information about the 
moral violation and its consequences independent from 
each other. This is in line with prevention mindset ten-
dency to prevent negative consequences and attend to risk 
(consequences) information (Higgins 1997, 1998). Addi-
tionally, a prevention mindset is associated with delibera-
tive, analytical reasoning (Pham and Avnet 2004, 2009), 
use of external sources of information (Bless et al. 1992, 
1996), and accurate decision-making (Förster et al. 2003). 
Thus, individuals in a prevention mindset should use PN, 
AC, and AR to make decisions such that when AC is low, 
judgement should be less negative.
However, a promotion mindset should help individuals 
process information about a moral violation holistically, 
based on ideals and aspirations (Higgins 1997, 1998). In 
fact, promotion mindset places a greater reliance on feel-
ings, heuristics (Pham and Avnet 2004, 2009), intuition, 
internal sources of information (Bless et al. 1992, 1996), 
and rapid decision-making (Förster et al. 2003). Because 
they analyze information abstractly and use feelings in 
judgement, we expect individuals in a promotion mindset 
to report similar evaluations, regardless of AC. We pro-
pose, therefore, that AC should interact with regulatory 
focus orientation to influence individuals’ evaluations. 
Whereas having a prevention mindset should attenuate the 
impact of moral violations on judgments as long as AC is 
low, having a promotion mindset will not. In fact, when 
overtly lowering AC (e.g., specifying that consequences 
to the brand are mitigated), those in a prevention mindset 
should evaluate the transgressor less negatively than those 
in a promotion mindset do. Formally:
H1 Moral violation AC and regulatory focus orientation 
interact to influence evaluations, such that regardless of 
type of moral violation, evaluations will be less negative 
for those in prevention mindset when AC is low (vs. high). 
For those in a promotion mindset, however, such results are 
not expected.
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Relatedness to Job Performance
When moral violations are central to the brand performance, 
individuals should evaluate the violation more negatively. 
Though not investigated with regard to regulatory focus, 
some moral violations have been found to be less damaging 
than others (Bertolotti et al. 2013; Effron et al. 2015; Laurent 
et al. 2014; Lee et al. 2015). More specifically, when viola-
tions are unrelated (as opposed to related) to the transgres-
sor’s job performance, individuals are more likely to engage 
in moral decoupling strategies (Lee and Kwak 2016). For 
instance, in the case of athlete endorsers’ immoral behav-
iors, when the transgression is highly relevant to an athlete’s 
job performance (e.g., use of performance-enhancing drugs) 
versus unrelated to job performance (e.g., fraud), people are 
less likely to engage in moral decoupling and will have less 
favorable brand evaluations (Lee et al. 2015). Thus, moral 
violations related to the job performance of a transgressor 
are expected to be more harmful for the brand regardless of 
the regulatory focus. Formally:
H2 Regardless of the evaluator’s regulatory focus, a moral 
violation that is related (vs. unrelated) to job performance 
will result in lower brand evaluations.
The aforementioned discussion argues for the moderating 
role of regulatory orientation in the relationship between 
the moral violation type and consumer evaluations. Drawing 
on regulatory focus theory and given the nature of regula-
tory orientations, we believe that for those in a promotion 
mindset, relatedness of the moral violation is not a concern, 
as these individuals do not process information in a context-
specific manner (Zhu and Meyers-Levy 2007; Förster and 
Higgins 2005); rather they assess the situation as a general 
moral violation case. On the other hand, those with a preven-
tion mindset examine the consequences to the brand more 
critically, given their tendency to process context-specific/
local information (Higgins 1997, 1998). As such, when the 
violation is related (vs. unrelated) to the brand performance, 
we expect these individuals to perceive greater (lesser) 
damage to the brand, and evaluate the brand more (less) 
negatively. When the moral violation is related to a brand’s 
job performance, it should be more difficult for prevention-
oriented individuals to dissociate moral judgments from 
performance. For example, if a cyclist took performance-
enhancing drugs, it is more difficult to separate the judgment 
of the cyclist as an athlete from the moral misdeed, because 
his moral violation is tied to his job performance. In other 
words, the judgements are inseparable, and decoupling is 
not possible.
When decoupling is not feasible, other moral reason-
ing strategies (e.g., moral rationalization, moral coupling, 
etc.) more likely occur. As opposed to decoupling, these 
alternative strategies yield tension and negative emotions 
for the evaluator (Thøgersen 2004; Lee et al. 2016). As such, 
prevention-oriented individuals’ inability to exercise moral 
decoupling will result in negative emotions. However, when 
the moral violation is not directly related to the brand’s job 
performance, decoupling would be easier and thus, individu-
als will be able to maintain a positive view of themselves and 
their moral standards. Consequently, less-negative emotions 
are experienced. Thus, we predict that negative emotions 
underlie the judgments for these interactions.
The role of emotions in moral judgment has been a topic 
of debate for centuries (Cannon et al. 2011). Some philoso-
phers (e.g., Immanuel Kant) followed a rationalist view to 
moral judgments and saw little role for emotions in judg-
ments of morality. Other philosophers (e.g., David Hume), 
however, believed that emotions drive moral judgments. This 
view has been further developed in contemporary psycho-
logical theories, suggesting a central role for emotions in 
moral judgments. Extant research has provided support for 
the existence of negative emotions such as anger and disgust 
with respect to moral violations (Chan et al. 2014; Starcke 
et al. 2011; Romani et al. 2015). Recent findings suggest that 
moral judgments relate more with emotions than deliberate 
reasoning (Greene and Haidt 2002; Teper et al. 2015). Yet, 
the underlying role of such emotional experiences in firm or 
brand evaluations has not been examined.
The mere feeling of emotions can trigger an approach 
or avoidance behavior (Labroo and Rucker 2010). Positive 
emotions activate approach behavior and result in optimistic 
evaluations of risk and consequences. Negative emotions, 
however, lead to avoidance, delayed decision-making, out-
right refusal to making decisions (Anderson 2003; Luce 
1998; Luce et al. 2000), and pessimistic evaluations (John-
son and Tversky 1983). Interestingly, negative emotions can 
enhance perceptions of risk and consequences (Lerner et al. 
2003) because they are more closely linked to risk judge-
ments (Slovic 1987). Relatedly, negative emotions evoke 
thoughts of impending negative consequences and heighten 
feelings of negative outcomes (Carver and Scheier 1998; 
Schwarz and Clore 1983), lowering evaluations (Griske-
vicius et al. 2009; Lee and Andrade 2011; Lerner and Kelt-
ner 2001; Raghunathan and Pham 1999).
Thus, in the specific case of moral judgements and as 
discussed earlier, prevention mindset individuals’ inability 
to exercise moral decoupling for moral violations related to 
brand’s job performance (and thus, relying on less preferred 
moral judgment strategies) results in experiencing negative 
emotions. In turn, this causes more pessimistic evaluations 
of the brand (Smith and Trope 2006; Roy and Phau 2014; 
Förster and Higgins 2005). Thus, we predict that for indi-
viduals with a prevention mindset, negative emotions will 
underlie differences in brand evaluations between violation 
types. Formally:
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H3 There will be an interaction between moral violation 
type and regulatory focus on brand evaluations, such that 
brand evaluations will be less negative for prevention (vs. 
promotion) mindsets when the brand does not violate a per-
formance-related moral foundation. In a promotion mindset, 
however, we do not expect the moral violation type (perfor-
mance-related or not) to make a difference.
H4 Negative emotions mediate the relationship between the 
interaction of moral violation and regulatory focus orienta-
tion on brand evaluations.
Overview of Studies
The present studies investigate a novel possibility that 
people with a prevention mindset can separate moral judg-
ment from brand judgment, potentially employing a moral 
decoupling strategy. Investigating this issue, the research 
distinguishes two alternative explanations, namely moral 
decoupling and individual political orientation. A politi-
cal orientation account suggests that individual judgments 
stem not from motivational characteristics but from indi-
vidual attitudes (e.g., Iyer et al. 2012; Graham et al. 2009), 
where liberals (vs. conservatives) judge a binding morality 
violation, such as a purity violation, less negatively. Given 
that morality research has investigated individuals’ political 
orientations within general, non-political contexts, it would 
be relevant to examine this alternative explanation within a 
political business context. Alternatively, a regulatory focus 
account predicts that individuals with a prevention mindset 
will judge a brand less negatively if consequences (i.e., AC) 
are low (versus high). This would provide initial support that 
having a prevention (vs. promotion) mindset could moti-
vate individuals to engage in moral decoupling strategies, 
enhancing brand evaluations.
Along these lines, we investigate how regulatory focus 
orientation and AC interact to influence brand evaluations, 
while simultaneously measuring individual political ori-
entation. Given that moral decoupling involves separating 
personal judgments of the moral act from judgments of the 
brand, we predict that individuals with a prevention mindset 
are more likely to exhibit moral decoupling. Specifically, 
we expect individuals with a prevention mindset to judge 
a brand less negatively provided (vs. not provided) assur-
ance of low AC. However, the type of violation will serve 
as a boundary condition, making it harder for those in a 
prevention mindset to morally decouple when the misdeed 
is related to the brand’s job performance.
Three studies provide empirical support for the proposed 
moral decoupling explanation and reject the alternative 
account of individual political orientation since political 
orientation neither influences brand evaluations in several 
studies nor changes how regulatory focus and AC inform 
brand evaluations. Study 1 provides evidence that those in a 
prevention mindset can decouple when AC is low (vs. high). 
Study 2 extends these findings with a performance-related 
(e.g., authority) violation. This study offers new evidence 
that a prevention mindset’s decoupling abilities could be hin-
dered when AC is high (vs. low) for performance-related 
scenarios. Finally, Study 3 compares the violation types 
under high AC and offers further evidence for the boundary 
effect of violation type (in terms of its relevance to perfor-
mance). The results provide further insights about situations 
where decoupling is hindered, resulting in negative emotions 
that mediate the interactive effect of violation type and regu-
latory focus on brand evaluations.
Method
Before conducting the main studies, a pre-test, inspired by 
Haidt and colleagues, was run to create AC conditions and 
authority and purity violation scenarios for the main stud-
ies within a political brand context. A sample of (n = 56) 
business professionals, marketing practitioners, and academ-
ics were exposed to one of four conditions (see “Appendix 
A: Moral Violation Scenarios”): purity violation with high 
AC, purity violation with low AC, authority violation with 
high AC, and authority violation with low AC. Then, they 
were asked to report the violation type (“Please indicate the 
degree to which you agree that the risk in the scenario con-
cerns a(n) purity (authority) violation”; Shweder et al. 1997) 
and the consequences (“The scenario does not include any 
risks to Charles Johnson or others”). All items used a Lik-
ert-type scale, where 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly 
agree. A single t test (test value = 4) was used to assess the 
viability of scenarios. The t test revealed that all partici-
pants who read the purity scenario considered it related to 
purity (M = 5.00, SD = 2.16; t =2.02, p < 0.03). Likewise, 
those who read the authority scenario considered it related 
to authority (M = 4.65, SD = 1.62; t =1.65, p = 0.05). Next, 
a one-way ANOVA compared the AC perceptions and 
revealed that consequences were significantly lower in 
the low (vs. high) AC scenario (M = 2.30, SD = 1.64 vs. 
M = 4.43, SD = 2.15, respectively; F(1,55) = 5.40; p < 0.04), 
supporting the scenarios.
Given that the aim of the pre-test was to test the appro-
priateness of the scenarios, the pre-test results are limited 
to a professional sample. Therefore, two follow up pre-
tests were run to establish the viability of the scenarios 
for the target population. First, a pre-test for the authority 
scenario was run using a sample of 64 U.S. citizens (51% 
male; Mage = 41 years) on Mturk. The study manipulated 
AC on two levels (low vs. high), identical to the previ-
ously created scenarios. After random assignment to one 
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of the AC levels, participants responded to nine seven-
point semantic differential items reflecting, “How would 
you describe the actions of Charles Johnson as described 
in the scenario?” with four morality items embedded 
in a list of nine descriptors (immoral/moral; bad/good; 
incorrect/correct; unacceptable/acceptable; α = 0.92) and 
one of the items measuring AC (risky/not risky-reverse 
coded subsequently so that high scores indicated higher 
perceived consequences). Next, they responded to, “How 
much do you think the situation is concerned with the 
following?” for each of purity standards (respect for reli-
gious traditions), loyalty towards a group, caretaking, 
and undermining authority (where 1 = not at all, 7 = very 
much).
An ANOVA with AC (0 = low, 1 = high) as the inde-
pendent variables revealed no effect on perceptions of 
morality (F < 1) or authority. Importantly, a single t test 
(test value = 4) was used to assess the relevancy of the 
scenarios for investigating morality and the scenario as 
authority-related. The t test revealed that all participants 
considered the scenarios more closely related to immo-
rality (M = 3.47, SD = 1.25; t =− 3.24, p < 0.01), offer-
ing support that the authority scenarios reflect immo-
rality, and related to authority (M = 4.80, SD = 1.66; 
t =3.67, p < 0.001). An ANOVA with risk perceptions as 
the dependent variable indicated that low AC scenario 
resulted in lower risk perceptions (M = 3.82, SD = 1.40) 
than the high AC scenario (M  = 5.40, SD = 0.89; 
F(1,63) = 27.11, p < 0.001).
A second pre-test for the purity scenario was run 
using a sample of sixty-three U.S. citizens (70% female; 
Mage = 43 years) on Mturk. The study manipulated AC 
on two levels (low vs. high), identical to the previously 
created scenarios. After random assignment to one of the 
AC levels, participants responded to the same items in the 
prior pre-test. Unfortunately, risk perceptions did not dif-
fer among scenarios (F < 1). Thus, the AC strength from 
the scenario was enhanced to strengthen the manipulation 
of high AC (included in “Appendix A: Moral Violation 
Scenarios”), and additional data were collected, result-
ing in an Mturk sample of 64 U.S. citizens (60% female; 
Mage = 41 years). This time, there was a significant dif-
ference between the low AC (M = 5.20, SD = 1.57) and 
high AC (M = 6.00, SD = 0.90; F(1,63) = 6.62, p < 0.001) 
scenarios on risk perceptions. As expected, no differences 
emerged when examining morality (F < 1; α = 0.94) or 
purity scenarios (F < 1) as dependent variables. A single 
t test (test value = 4) indicated that participants perceived 
the purity scenarios reflective of immorality (M = 3.42, 
SD = 1.39; t =− 3.32, p < 0.01) and purity (M = 4.81, 
SD = 1.82; t =4.00, p < 0.001). Therefore, the scenarios 
were deemed relevant for the population.
Study 1: Purity Moral Violation
The goal of this study was twofold. First, we aimed to 
respond to the first research question, whether both regula-
tory focus and AC affect brand evaluations. We expect that 
individuals with a prevention mindset will judge a brand less 
negatively if AC is low (vs. high). The low and improved 
high AC scenarios from the third pre-test were employed for 
this study. Second, the study tests an alternative explanation 
to moral decoupling account, individual political orientation.
Participants, Procedure, and Stimuli
One hundred and forty-one U.S. citizens (53% male; 
Mage = 36 years) participated in an online Mturk study. The 
study consisted of two manipulated factors with two levels 
each in a between subjects design: regulatory focus (preven-
tion vs. promotion mindset) and AC (low vs. high).
We informed participants that they would be taking part 
in two separate studies. First, they completed a writing task 
to manipulate regulatory focus orientation. Following Hig-
gins et al. (2003), each participant wrote an essay focused 
on his/her current hopes and aspirations and future accom-
plishments (i.e., promotion prime) or his/her current duties 
and obligations and responsibilities (i.e., prevention prime) 
compared to childhood. Next, participants were randomly 
assigned to a political scenario, which varied by AC (low vs. 
high), where a candidate sought election (see “Appendix A: 
Moral Violation Scenarios” for scenarios).
Next, participants evaluated the brand (i.e., candidate) 
operationalized by voting intentions for the candidate. Vot-
ing intentions served as a viable measure of brand evaluation 
for several reasons. First, voters evaluate and allocate their 
support for politicians in the same manner that consumers 
do towards brands and social groups (Bennett et al. 2019). 
Second, voting intentions capture the conative (i.e., behav-
ioral) dimension of consumers’ attitude towards the brand 
(i.e., candidate), reflecting their assessment of the brand. 
Finally, this approach is in line with prior research (see 
Dekhili and Achabou 2015; Van den Broek et al. 2017). 
Five bipolar items were used (“Please rate how likely you 
are to vote for Charles Johnson” with options Never/Defi-
nitely; Probably not/Probably; Definitely against/Definitely 
for; Definitely do not intend to/Definitely intent to; Very 
low probability/Very high probability; α = 0.98; Spears and 
Singh 2004). Then, they evaluated whether they believed the 
politician was supported by a large political party (1 = not at 
all; 7 = very much). This was considered a covariate given 
that the narrative did not indicate a political party (see Van 
Steenburg 2015) and the fact that support from a second-
ary brand can influence moral judgment. After reporting if 
they were registered to vote (89.4%), participants indicated 
their political orientation through one item in line with Iyer 
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et al. (2012): “Although it is often difficult to summarize 
one’s political, economic, and social views in a single word 
or phrase, please indicate which of the following positions 
best represents your viewpoint” (1 = very liberal; 7 = very 
conservative) and were found to have moderate political 
views (M = 3.72, SD = 1.81). Next, participants responded 
to the regulatory focus manipulation check item, “Pursu-
ing one’s hopes and dreams at all costs are very important” 
(1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree), where higher 
(lower) scores indicate a promotion (prevention) mindset. 
Then, they answered two items designed to capture the 
manipulation effectiveness of AC using a 7-point bipolar 
scale (e.g., “How would you characterize the situation faced 
by Charles Johnson?- Potential for Gain/Potential for Loss; 
Positive Situation/Negative Situation;” α = 0.70). Higher 
scores indicated AC is felt more (e.g., high AC). Finally, par-
ticipants provided demographic information before debrief-
ing, where age and gender served as covariates since moral 
judgment develops over time (Walker 1989) and Gilligan 
(1982) suggests it is possible that genders differ in funda-
mental moral reasoning.
Results
Preliminary Analysis To check the regulatory focus manip-
ulation, we ran an ANCOVA with regulatory focus prime 
(0 = prevention, 1 = promotion) and AC (0 = low, 1 = high) 
as independent variables, age (p = 0.003), gender, and 
party support perceptions (p’s > 0.1, dropped from further 
analysis) as covariates, and the regulatory focus manipu-
lation check as the dependent variable. As expected, the 
ANOVA revealed only a main effect of the regulatory 
focus prime. Those in the promotion (vs. prevention) mind-
set were more inclined to pursue their hopes and dreams 
(M = 4.75, SD = 1.68 vs. M = 4.29, SD = 1.54, respectively; 
F(1,140) = 3.80; p = 0.05). An identical ANCOVA (where 
age was the only significant (p = .03) covariate) was run 
with the AC manipulation check as the dependent vari-
able, revealing only a significant effect for the AC condi-
tion (F(1,140) = 3.87; p = 0.05). Those assigned to the low 
AC condition perceived lower perceptions of consequences 
(M = 4.23, SD = 1.44) than those assigned the high AC con-
dition (M = 4.74, SD = 1.30).
Brand Evaluations An ANCOVA with regulatory focus 
prime and AC as the independent variables, with age 
(p = 0.003), gender, and party support perceptions (p’s > 0.1, 
dropped from further analysis) as covariates and brand 
evaluations as the dependent variable provided a significant 
interaction supporting H1 as shown in Table 2.
Planned contrasts revealed that in the prevention 
prime, low (vs. high) AC resulted in less-negative brand 
evaluations. However, for the promotion prime, AC had 
no impact, supporting H1. With low AC, the prevention 
(vs. promotion) prime led to less-negative brand evalua-
tions. Though, for the high AC condition, there was no 
difference in brand evaluations. Figure 1 illustrates these 
relationships.
To rule out the alternative explanation that an individual’s 
political orientation rather than regulatory focus orientation 
explains differences in brand evaluations, we considered 
political orientation as a covariate and ran another identical 
ANCOVA. The results were similar with and without the 
political orientation as a covariate (i.e., despite the signifi-
cance of political orientation as a covariate (F(1,140) = 8.00, 
p < 0.01, 휂2 = 0.06), the significance of the two-way interac-
tion strengthened (F(1,140) = 5.62, p < 0.02, 휂2 = 0.04), and 
the planned contrasts remained intact).
Discussion
The results provide initial support for moral decoupling 
stemming from regulatory focus, while rejecting the alter-
native account based on individual political orientation. 
Specifically, political orientation did not change the inter-
action of AC and regulatory focus on brand evaluations. 
This study supports our theorizing, at least in a purity 
violation scenario, that individuals in a prevention mindset 
report less-negative brand evaluations when consequences 
to the brand was low (H1). Specifically, differences within 
the prevention prime at high versus low AC indicate that 
when individuals experience a prevention mindset, they 
are more capable of evaluating a brand separately from his/
her moral evaluation. However, when experiencing a pro-
motion mindset, individuals do not process different pieces 
of information independently and form evaluations in a 
holistic manner. Still, more research is needed to general-
ize these results across other moral violations. Therefore, 























Fig. 1  Interaction of regulatory focus × AC on brand evaluations for 
purity violations
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Study 2: Authority Moral Violation
The goal of this study was threefold. First, we aimed to 
provide additional support that a prevention mindset can 
facilitate decoupling. Second, we sought to increase gener-
alizability by examining a new context (i.e., authority) that 
is job-related for politicians. More specifically and in the 
context of politics, brand performance depends on leader-
ship qualities (Guzmán and Sierra 2009), which are built 
over time. As such, political brand judgments are based on 
whether they respect established codes of conduct (Bertolotti 
et al. 2013; Laurent et al. 2014; Tweneboah-Koduah et al. 
2010), consistent with respect of authority. Moreover, prior 
research on voters’ perceptions of politicians has highlighted 
the importance of brand authority in successful candidates 
(Needham and Smith 2015). Thus, we chose to employ the 
authority moral scenario. Second, we changed the regulatory 
focus prime from a writing task to viewing a political ad to 
increase the ecological validity of the study. We expect that 
individuals with a prevention mindset will judge a brand less 
negatively if AC is low versus high. Finally, the study tested 
individual political orientation as an alternative explanation.
Participants, Procedure, and Stimuli
One hundred thirty-five U.S. citizens (58% female; 
Mage = 38 years) participated in an online Mturk study. The 
study consisted of two manipulated factors on two levels 
each in a between subjects design: regulatory focus prime 
(prevention vs. promotion mindset) and AC (low vs. high).
Participants were randomly assigned to a prevention or 
promotion regulatory focus prime. Specifically, participants 
viewed a video advertisement for a political brand. The 
design, layout, and sounds were identical across conditions, 
with the exception of the wording in the ad, similar to Mogil-
ner et al. (2008). Keywords in the videos differed according 
to prevention versus promotion priming. For instance, the 
promotion (prevention) video referred to voting as an oppor-
tunity (responsibility) and described the hypothetical can-
didate as an ideal candidate (a candidate you need) that the 
American people can be proud of (won’t regret). The full ad 
played for 65 s (see “Appendix B: Promotion and Prevention 
Priming”). The political brand appeared as a neutral party 
individual running for political office in the United States.
After viewing the advertisement, participants read one of 
two AC scenarios reflecting authority, developed from the 
pre-tests. Next, participants responded to the brand evalua-
tion measures operationalized as intent to vote as in Study 
1 (α = 0.99; Spears and Singh 2004). As a manipulation 
check, participants also indicated the degree to which the 
ad reflected a promotion (vs. prevention) mindset using four 
items (e.g., “Which of the following phrases best describes 
Charles Johnson as a candidate?” where 1 = ideal/an 
opportune choice/something positive/pursuing a good choice 
and 7 = necessary/a secure choice/something negative/avoid-
ing a bad choice; α = 0.79; Mogilner et al. 2008). Higher 
scores indicated prevention mindset. Next, individuals 
completed the same AC perception item as in study 1, with 
higher scores signaling high AC. Before completing demo-
graphics, participants indicated whether they believed the 
politician was supported by a large political party (1 = not 
at all; 7 = very much).
Results
Preliminary Analysis To check the regulatory focus manipu-
lation, we conducted an ANCOVA with the regulatory focus 
prime (0 = prevention, 1 = promotion) and AC (0 = low, 
1 = high) as independent variables, with age, gender, and 
party support perceptions as covariates (all p’s > 0.1), and 
the manipulation check items as the dependent variable. As 
expected, ANOVA revealed only a main effect of regulatory 
focus, where those in the promotion (vs. prevention) prime 
were less likely to think of the political brand with a preven-
tion mindset (M = 4.89, SD = 1.74 vs. M = 3.12, SD = 1.64 
prevention vs. promotion; F(1,135) = 37.83; p = 0.001). 
Next, the same ANCOVA was run with the AC perceptions 
as the dependent variable. Aside from party support as a 
significant covariate (p < 0.001), only a significant effect 
was revealed for the AC manipulation (F(1,135) = 5.92, 
p < 0.02). Those in the high AC condition reported more 
consequences (M = 4.96, SD = 1.49) versus those in the low 
AC condition (M = 4.18, SD = 1.68).
Brand Evaluations An ANCOVA with regulatory focus 
and AC as independent variables; age (p = 0.03), gender 
(p > 0.1, dropped from further analysis), and party sup-
port (p < 0.001) as covariates; and brand evaluation as the 
dependent variable provided a significant interaction, sup-
porting H1, as shown in Table 2.
Planned contrasts within the promotion prime revealed no 
differences in brand evaluations between the AC conditions. 
However, as expected, those primed with a prevention mind-
set reported less-negative brand evaluations with low (vs. 
high) AC, consistent with H2. Moreover, planned contrasts 
within the high AC condition showed that evaluations were 
worse for those primed with a prevention (vs. promotion) 
mindset. Within low AC, regulatory focus did not influence 
evaluations, as shown in Fig. 2.
To rule out the alternative explanation that an individual’s 
political orientation rather than regulatory focus orientation 
explains differences in brand evaluations, we considered 
political orientation as a covariate and ran an additional 
ANCOVA. While political orientation was not significant 
(p > 0.58), the two-way interaction remained significant 
(F(1,137) = 3.77, p < 0.05, 휂2 = 0.03), lending support to 
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our argument that political orientation does not explain the 
results.
Discussion
The results provide further support for the role of regula-
tory focus orientation as a motivational driver of decoupling. 
Similar to study 1, which focused on purity (i.e., unrelated to 
political job performance), study 2 indicates that those in a 
prevention mindset can engage in moral decoupling, evaluat-
ing the brand differently based on AC. Study 2 (in compari-
son with study 1) sheds new light on prevention mindset by 
demonstrating that those in a prevention mindset evaluate 
the brand more harshly than those in a promotion mindset 
in case of a moral violation related to political job perfor-
mance (i.e., authority violation). Still, those in a promotion 
mindset consistently evaluate the brand. Study 2 shares a 
novel finding for regulatory focus literature by showing an 
instance where individuals in a prevention mindset may be 
less capable of decoupling (dissociating moral information 
from performance in their evaluations). We argue this inabil-
ity results in experiencing internal tensions (negative emo-
tions) that will impact evaluations. Moral violation type and 
the relatedness of the violation to the brand’s performance 
may provide a boundary condition to what we traditionally 
understand about prevention regulatory focus orientation. 
To explore this more and examine whether emotions indeed 
explain these processes, we devised a third study.
Study 3: Moral Foundation Violations (Un)Related 
to Job Performance
The objectives of Study 3 were twofold. First, we replicated 
the moral violation contexts controlling for AC in order to 
increase the confidence in the study results and further sup-
port theorizing. We expect authority violations to result in 
greater damage to political brands due to their relevance 
to politicians’ job performance (see Walzer 1978, 1980). 
However, purity violations do not impede, improve, or 
affect job performance for a politician and are considered to 
be less relevant to job performance in politics. Thus, such 
violations are expected to be less damaging to the brand 
and more likely to be judged by consumers following moral 
decoupling strategies (depending on consumers’ regulatory 
focus). As these types of violations represent moral founda-
tions related (vs. not related) to the brand’s job performance, 
we examine this in Study 3. Second, we aimed to exam-
ine the dynamics of moral decoupling strategies within the 
prevention mindset via testing an underlying mechanism, 
negative emotions.
Participants, Procedure, and Stimuli
One hundred fifty-three U.S. citizens (54% female; 
Mage = 38 years) participated in an online study on Mturk. 
The design of the study consisted of two manipulated fac-
tors on two levels in a between subjects design: regulatory 
focus prime (prevention vs. promotion mindset) and high AC 
scenario (purity vs. authority).
Participants were randomly assigned to a regulatory 
focus prime (prevention vs. promotion), identical to study 
2. After viewing the advertisement, participants read the 
high AC versions of one of two moral foundation scenarios 
(see Appendix A). Next, they completed the brand evalua-
tion measure (α = 0.99). However, to examine hypothesis 
4, participants also rated the extent to which they felt nega-
tive emotions (5 items: anger, disgust, sadness, anxiety, and 
disappointment) on a 7-point scale (where 1 = not at all and 
7 = extremely; α = 0.89) followed by the same party support 
perceptions. Then, they responded to the same manipula-
tion check items for the regulatory focus prime (α = 0.86). 
In order to check the extent to which the scenarios differed 
on job performance, participants responded to one item 
(“Thinking back to the scenario you read, indicate the extent 
to which the scenario concerns something related to his job” 
1 = not at all, 7 = very much). Lastly, participants completed 
demographic items, indicating that 95% were registered to 
vote.
Results
Preliminary Analysis To check the regulatory focus orien-
tation manipulation, we ran an ANCOVA with the regula-
tory focus prime (0 = prevention, 1 = promotion), moral 
violation (0 = purity, 1 = authority), and their interactions as 
independent variables, with age and party support as covari-
ates, and the manipulation check items as the regulatory 
focus manipulation check as the dependent variable. The 






















Fig. 2  Interaction of regulatory focus × risk mitigation on brand eval-
uations for authority violation
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as covariates revealed only a significant main effect of the 
regulatory focus prime, in that those in the promotion (vs. 
prevention) mindset were less likely to think of the politi-
cal brand with a prevention focus (M = 5.25, SD = 1.27 
vs. M = 2.48, SD = 0.94, for prevention vs. promotions; 
F(1,152) = 248.42; p = 0.001). An identical ANCOVA, with 
age (p < .01) and party support (p < 0.001) as significant 
covariates, was run with relatedness to job performance as 
the dependent variable, revealing only a significant main 
effect for the situation type (F(1,152) = 58.58, p < 0.001). 
Those assigned the authority condition reported the situa-
tion as more job-related (M = 4.35, SD = 1.67) than those 
assigned the purity scenario (M = 2.22, SD = 1.74).
Brand Evaluations An ANOVA with regulatory focus 
prime, moral scenario, and their interaction as the independ-
ent variables, with age (p < 0.01), gender (p > 0.1, dropped 
from further analysis), and party support (p < 0.001) as 
covariates, and brand evaluations as the dependent variable, 
revealed a significant main effect of moral situational context 
(purity vs. authority), indicating that the authority violation 
was evaluated more negatively compared to the purity vio-
lation (supporting H2). More importantly, as hypothesized, 
there was a significant interaction between moral violation 
scenario and regulatory focus, as shown in Table 3. Addi-
tional analysis was conducted including political orientation 
as a covariate to demonstrate the robustness of our findings. 
While political orientation was not significant (p > 0.13), the 
two-way interaction remained significant (F(1,152) = 3.74, 
p = 0.05, 휂2 = 0.03), lending support that political orienta-
tion does not explain our results.
Planned contrasts revealed within the promotion mindset 
reported no differences in brand evaluations for the purity 
versus authority scenario. As predicted, those primed with 
a prevention mindset reported less-negative brand evalua-
tions for the purity scenario than for the authority scenario. 
In the purity scenario, brand evaluations were less negative 
for those primed with a prevention versus promotion mind-
set. Those who read the authority scenario reported similar 
brand evaluations across both regulatory focus priming con-
ditions, as shown in Fig. 3, lending support to H3.
Negative Emotions To explore the role of negative emo-
tions as the underlying mechanism for the interaction 
between regulatory focus orientation and moral violation 
type on brand evaluations, a moderated mediation analysis 
using PROCESS Model 8 (Hayes 2012) was conducted. In 
the regression model, brand evaluation was the dependent 
variable, moral scenario, regulatory focus prime, and their 
interaction term served as predictors and negative emotions 
was the mediator.
A bootstrap analysis supports the H3 and H4 account of 
mediated moderation, showing that the indirect effect of the 
highest order interaction was significant (Index = − 0.21; 
95% CI LL = − 0.4647; UL = − 0.0154). Additionally, the 
effect of the moral scenario and regulatory focus prime 
interaction on negative emotions was significant (β = 1.05; 
t = 2.45; p < 0.02), as was the effect of negative emotions 
on brand evaluations (β = − 0.20; t = − 2.60; p = 0.01). Spe-
cifically, the indirect effect through the mediator provided 
evidence that within a prevention mindset, emotions led to 
more negative evaluations in an authority (vs. purity) sce-
nario (β = − 0.14; 95% CI LL = − 0.3223; UL = − 0.0037). 
Yet, no differences in emotions occurred across moral sce-
narios for individuals with a promotion mindset (β = 0.07; 
95% CI LL = − 0.0408; UL = 0.2134).
Discussion
The results offer further evidence that brand evaluations dif-
fer by regulatory focus, consistent with the ability to sepa-
rate judgments of the brand and judgments of immorality. 
Moreover, relatedness to job performance serves as a bound-
ary condition. The findings show that a promotion mindset 
is less conducive to moral decoupling and thus is expected 
to influence brand evaluations following a moral violation 
regardless of the type of violation and its relatedness to a 
brand’s job performance. However, a prevention mindset 
is more conducive to employing moral decoupling (which 
avoids compromising the self-concept). When the moral 
foundation violation is not directly related to the brand’s 
performance (i.e., purity violation for a political brand), 
decoupling is facilitated, and less-negative emotions occur. 
Conversely, when the moral violation is related to a brand’s 
performance, it is difficult to attenuate negative evaluations, 
and thus those in a prevention mindset experience nega-
tive emotions. As such, the results offer further support for 
decoupling, while identifying a boundary condition (relat-























Fig. 3  Interaction of regulatory focus × moral violation type on brand 
evaluations
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for when and how such strategies are experienced. These 
insights add specificity regarding the role of regulatory focus 
in decoupling strategies.
The results of study 3 confirm the overall thesis of the 
present research regarding the role of regulatory orienta-
tion in judgment of different moral violations. However, 
it is noteworthy that comparing planned contrasts within 
the regulatory mindsets for authority and purity violations 
(despite not being the focal contrasts hypothesized) shows 
slightly different results from studies 1 and 2 (please refer 
to Tables 1, 2, and 3). We believe these differences could 
have arisen for several reasons. First, the priming of regula-
tory focus orientation was strengthened for studies 2 and 3, 
potentially resulting in more stringent reflections of each 
mindset versus that used in study 1. As such, a significant 
difference may have emerged within the purity scenario 
between the promotion and prevention mindset, where the 
difference was non-significant in study 1. Second, other 
potential moderators could explain some of these changes. 
Although within the authority scenario, the results are direc-
tionally similar, the differences are not significant in study 3. 
One explanation could be the participants’ own prior moral 
Table 1  ANCOVA results of 
study 1
RFP (0 = prevention, 1 = promotion)
AC (0 = low, 1 = high)
Dependent variable: brand evaluations F(1,140) p value η2 M0 (SD) M1 (SD)
Regulatory focus prime (RFP) 1.65 ns 0.01 4.36 (1.85) 3.97 (1.74)
Awareness of consequences (AC) 2.21 ns 0.02 4.36 (1.80) 3.95 (1.77)
RFP × AC 4.76 0.03 0.03
Planned contrasts
 Prevention (0) 6.94 0.01 0.09 4.95 (1.79) 3.77 (1.75)
 Promotion (1) 0.25 ns < 0.01 3.86 (1.69) 4.05 (1.79)
 AC low (0) 6.39 0.01 0.09 4.95 (1.79) 3.86 (1.69)
 AC high (1) 0.49 ns < 0.01 3.77 (1.75) 4.05 (1.79)
Table 2  ANCOVA results of 
study 2
RFP (0 = prevention, 1 = promotion)
AC (0 = low, 1 = high)
Dependent variable: brand evaluations F(1,137) p value η2 M0 (SD) M1 (SD)
Regulatory focus prime (RFP) 1.24 ns 0.01 2.96 (1.69) 3.24 (1.72)
Awareness of consequences (AC) 0.00 ns < 0.01 3.29 (1.79) 2.93 (1.62)
RFP × AC 4.16 0.04 0.03
Planned contrasts
 Prevention (0) 5.06 0.02 0.04 3.31 (1.78) 2.64 (1.56)
 Promotion (1) 0.00 ns < 0.01 3.25 (1.84) 3.23 (1.65)
 AC low (0) 0.04 ns < 0.01 3.31 (1.78) 3.25 (1.84)
 AC high (1) 4.04 0.04 0.03 2.64 (1.56) 3.23 (1.65)
Table 3  ANCOVA results of 
study 3
RFP (0 = prevention, 1 = promotion)
AC (0 = purity [unrelated], 1 = authority [related])
Dependent variable: brand evaluations F(1,152) p value η2 M0 (SD) M1 (SD)
Regulatory focus prime (RFP) 1.85 ns 0.01 3.08 (1.40) 2.71 (1.61)
Moral situational context (MSC) 20.11 0.001 0.12 3.07 (1.61) 2.08 (1.39)
RFP × MSC 3.93 0.05 0.03
Planned contrasts
 Prevention (0) 15.59 0.001 0.22 4.13 (1.32) 3.00 (1.40)
 Promotion (1) 1.16 ns 0.04 3.23 (1.46) 2.92 (1.33)
 Purity (0) 9.78 0.001 0.07 4.13 (1.32) 3.23 (1.46)
 Authority (1) 0.08 ns < 0.01 3.00 (1.40) 2.92 (1.33)
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behavior, which moderates the influence of regulatory focus 
on consumers’ moral behavior (Schwabe et al. 2018). Addi-
tionally, perceptions of behavioral integrity, the perceived 
alignment between an individual’s words and deeds (Simons 
2002; Palanski et al. 2011), could have influenced the impact 
of regulatory focus on consumer responses. Specifically, in 
a prevention mindset, individuals’ responses and behaviors 
are strengthened (Kacmar and Tucker 2014). As aforemen-
tioned, while not the focus of this third study, differences did 
emerge. This provides several directions for future research 
to explore in depth.
General Discussion
The results of three experiments support the hypothesized 
relationships between moral violation type, AC of moral 
violations, regulatory focus, and brand evaluations. Though 
we used a political context to explore these relationships, 
it is expected that the results are generalizable to business 
and brand situations. Specifically, the studies respond to the 
question regarding how some brands experience positive 
evaluations following a moral violation while others do not, 
by providing insights on who, when, and how decoupling 
strategies are employed as a means to attenuate negative 
judgment towards violating businesses and brands. Fur-
ther, the results help reject an alternative account that an 
individual’s political orientation explains moral decoupling 
tendencies.
Studies 1 and 2 provide support that individuals with a 
prevention mindset evaluate a brand that has violated a moral 
foundation less negatively when AC is low (vs. high). This 
pattern of results occurs for violations unrelated to brand 
performance (study 1; purity violation) and related to perfor-
mance (study 2; authority violation). Moreover, when AC is 
low and the violation is not performance-related, those with 
a prevention mindset evaluate the brand less negatively than 
those with a promotion mindset, supporting moral decou-
pling (study 1). However, in high AC scenarios, moral viola-
tions related (vs. unrelated) to the brand’s performance are 
more damaging (study 3), and cause difficulty in employing 
moral decoupling even by prevention-oriented individuals, 
resulting in negative emotions. The underlying mechanism, 
negative emotions, further explains our theorizing for why 
consumers negatively evaluate businesses and brands. This 
work provides several theoretical and practical contributions.
Theoretical and Managerial Contributions
First, while recent work has contributed to our understand-
ing of moral rationalization and decoupling strategies, a 
gap remains as to when individuals might employ a moral 
decoupling strategy and which individuals are more likely 
to employ such strategies. The present research addresses 
these gaps. We specifically chose a context (e.g., political 
branding) where moral decoupling strategies may be harder 
to engage in, as performance is more subjective (e.g., Bhat-
tacharjee et al. 2012) in order to delineate how decoupling 
strategies are employed. Past research has identified certain 
conditions prompting moral decoupling, including high 
brand identification (Lee et al. 2015) and when the moral 
violation is not related to job performance (Lee and Kwak 
2016). Our research contributes to this literature, by support-
ing regulatory focus as a motivational drive state explaining 
why some individuals might be more prone to decoupling. In 
line with prior research demonstrating that moral decoupling 
strategies prevent consumers from experiencing negative 
emotions (Lee et al. 2016) and that job-related moral vio-
lations hinder moral decoupling strategies (Lee and Kwak 
2016), our research provides parallel evidence for individu-
als with a prevention mindset. Specifically, those in a pre-
vention mindset only exhibit more negative brand evalua-
tions when they perceive high consequences and when the 
brand violates a performance-related norm. This is explained 
through negative emotions.
Second, past research suggests that having a prevention 
mindset motivates preventing losses by being analytical 
and risk-averse, while a promotion mindset involves pursu-
ing gains by referencing feelings and hopes (Higgins 1997, 
1998). These facts insinuate that someone with a promotion 
mindset would use feelings to judge a brand following a 
moral violation, whereas someone with a prevention mindset 
would use facts and assessment of consequences to evalu-
ate this brand. Supported by distinct information processing 
styles of promotion and prevention mindsets, we provide evi-
dence across three studies that regulatory focus orientation 
can motivate or hinder decoupling strategies. Moreover, we 
document that those in a prevention mindset can experience 
more negative emotions in their judgments when the brand 
violates a moral foundation related to its job activities. This 
research provides one instance where having a prevention 
mindset may stir negative emotions, which may cause these 
individuals to more harshly evaluate brands (vs. those in a 
promotion mindset).
Third, this research acknowledges conflicting accounts for 
moral judgments. While some research, based on the NAM, 
suggests that individuals use logic to judge moral misdeeds 
based on AR, AC, and PN (Schwartz and Howard 1981), 
others claim that emotions are more likely to guide judgment 
and decision-making (Haidt 2001). The former is consistent 
with a moral decoupling process that disentangles the moral 
violation from personal judgment of a brand. The NAM 
specifies that highly felt personal norms and high culpabil-
ity for immoral actions lead to harsher judgments following 
immorality (Bloom 2013; De Groot and Steg 2009; DeSteno 
et al. 2004; Haidt 2001; Newman 2003). Yet, the latter posits 
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that emotions cause the evaluations of the person or brand 
to be equivalent to evaluations of the moral violation. This 
research suggests that the NAM model, compatible with lit-
erature on moral decoupling, is a strategy employed by those 
with a prevention mindset, unless the violation is job-related. 
On the other hand, those in a promotion mindset follow the 
emotional route to evaluations, consistent with the account 
led by researchers such as Haidt (2001) and colleagues. 
Thus, this research bridges these literatures.
Lastly, this research enhances the business ethics litera-
ture by drawing on regulatory focus theory, moral founda-
tions theory, and the NAM to bring new perspectives to 
understanding the dynamics of brand evaluations in the 
midst of moral violations. The proliferation of corporate, 
social, and political scandals has pushed researchers to 
assess these scandals to understand and predict consumers’ 
reactions to transgressions (Sturm 2017). This research spe-
cifically uses a political brand context given the extensive 
media coverage and public attention to politicians’ moral 
transgressions. Our research provides one instance general-
izing moral decoupling to these more subjective areas. The 
findings suggest that moral violations can be deemed less 
harmful to businesses and brands if they do not violate moral 
foundations related to on-the-job-performance as long as 
the brand can avoid negative consequences and facilitate a 
prevention mindset in consumers. Our research evinces that 
advertising can motivate a prevention mindset, though other 
research speaks to priming a prevention mindset by other 
means (e.g., press releases, language). This also helps politi-
cal brands and addresses gaps in political research (Guzmán 
et al. 2014; Guzmán and Sierra 2009) by investigating politi-
cal brand evaluations (Van Steenburg 2015).
Future Research and Limitations
In order to examine moral violations, we controlled for 
cross-country political biases by using a U.S population. 
Still, further research should explore whether the findings 
are generalizable in other Western contexts and cultures with 
greater cultural differences. Moreover, we did not take into 
account an individual’s level of involvement with the viola-
tion (e.g., authority subversion and purity), which potentially 
limits the results of the study. We did, however, measure 
indirect indicators of issue involvement (e.g., religiosity, 
political involvement, political cynicism, and skepticism) 
and found no significant effects. While past research docu-
ments brand involvement as a moderator (e.g., Lee et al. 
2015), it could be that issue involvement also moderates 
the motivation an individual has to employ moral decou-
pling, such that lower (greater) issue involvement might be 
more (less) amenable to moral decoupling. More research is 
needed to explore these tendencies in greater detail.
Although party support was included as a covariate 
across studies, it was not the scope of this research to 
investigate how support from another brand could alleviate 
emotional judgment, leading to a moral decoupling strat-
egy. Yet, perhaps this is the case. The positive role of party 
support hints to a positive endorsement effect. Nike used 
Tiger Woods and Charles Barkley in its advertising. Could 
this be one reason why Tiger Woods was not negatively 
judged, aside from the fact that his violation was non-job-
performance-related? This would be a fruitful avenue for 
future business ethics research.
Additionally, future research should investigate 
instances where a prevention mindset leads to greater or 
less use of emotion in decision-making. For this research, 
we chose authority and purity violations, as they are 
clearly related (and unrelated) to the brand’s job perfor-
mance in our study context. Yet, we chose types of viola-
tions (e.g., open marriage and data collection) that some 
people might deem acceptable. Thus, future research 
should be undertaken to investigate whether clear viola-
tions (e.g., extramarital affair) would reproduce the results 
or prevent decoupling. Further, as indicated by the dis-
cussion after study 3, there were some discrepancies in 
non-hypothesized relationships. While we argued that 
this could be due to different priming methods and addi-
tional moderators, more research is needed. In particular, 
participants’ own prior moral behavior may influence the 
relationship between regulatory focus and consumers’ 
evaluations following varying moral violations (Schwabe 
et al. 2018). Moreover, we suggest assessing the role of 
behavioral integrity, the perceived alignment between an 
individual’s words and deeds (e.g., Kacmar and Tucker 
2014; Palanski et al. 2011; Simons 2002), in moderating 
how those in a prevention mindset evaluate moral viola-
tions. Finally, future research should test how different 
foundations impact the extent of judgment in other subjec-
tive contexts, such as business leadership in cross-cultural 
settings.
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Appendix A: Moral Violation Scenarios
All Scenarios Included the Following Text
Charles Johnson is currently involved in U.S. politics. 
He has a wife named Lisa and is currently running for 
president. Charles Johnson has two priorities in his cam-
paign: (1) the state of the economy and (2) health care 
affordability.
Authority Violation Scenario
During Charles Johnson’s membership of the Presidential 
Cabinet, he created a new method for collecting security 
information. Charles Johnson did not seek permission from 
the current President or administrative staff first, because 
there was no policy explicitly forbidding it. There is already 
an information system in place that he could use, which 
serves the same purpose. Charles Johnson thought that 
it would be easier for him to use a secondary system. He 
remains in full control of the secondary system, refusing to 
hand over to anyone else.
Low AC When the President and administration discov-
ered harles’ actions, they were not mad. Charles felt no 
regrets about his actions and did not suffer any negative 
consequences. His actions did not cause any negative con-
sequences for anyone else.
High AC The President and administration discovered 
Charles Johnson’s actions. Charles Johnson felt no regrets 
about his actions but wonders what would happen to his 
career.
Purity Violation Scenario
During Charles Johnson’s membership of the Presidential 
Cabinet, he and his wife Lisa engaged in extramarital affairs, 
because Charles Johnson and Lisa have unconventional atti-
tudes to marriage; they have agreed to an open marriage. 
As a result, they often solicited sexual partners outside their 
marriage.
Low AC Lisa takes birth control pills, Charles always uses 
a condom, and their partners are always similarly cautious. 
When Charles Johnson decided to run for nomination as 
president, they decided to give up their alternative lifestyle. 
They feel no regrets about their past and have experienced 
no negative consequences. Likewise, none of their past part-
ners regret their involvement or have experienced negative 
consequences.
High AC (from professional pre-test only) When Charles 
received his party’s nomination for congress, they decided 
to give up their alternative life style.
High AC (used in third pre-test and studies 1 and 3) Lisa 
does not take birth control pills and Charles does not use a 
condom. When Charles received his party’s nomination for 
congress, they decided to give up their alternative life style.
Appendix B: Promotion and Prevention 
Priming
Participants were asked to watch a political ad for the candi-
date created using adobe spark. These ads began “Over the 
next 4 months you have a decision to make.”
The text for the promotion (prevention) ad reads:
Slide 1 with white house image: Over the next 2 months 
you will have a choice to make.
Slide 2 with a gray image of the world in a hand: Your deci-
sion matters for America.
Slide 3 blank It’s an opportunity (a responsibility) we all 
share.
Slide 4 with rows of tiny American flags in the ground: 
Charles Johnson is an ideal candidate (a candidate you 
need)—the one America can be proud of (won’t regret).
Slide 5 blank: Why is he the optimal choice? (How can 
you be sure?)
Slide 6 with coins, pens, and pencils on a typed sheet of 
paper to the left of the text: With (Without) Charles John-
son, America will achieve (risks) economic prosperity 
(uncertainty).
Slide 7 shows an American flag with blurred people putting 
their hands on their hearts: America has much to hope for 
over (can’t afford to gamble on) the next 4 years.
Slide 8 shows hands of persons in business attire shaking 
hands. The hands are painted the colors of the American 
flag: For America, the best choice is (needs) Charles John-
son.
Slide 9 shows a shadowed image of a speaker at a podium 
with supporters carrying posters: With (Without) Charles 
Johnson, cutting edge, affordable medical care is possible 
(medical coverage will decline while costs continue to rise).
Slide 10 blank Give yourself a brighter (Don’t settle for an 
uncertain) future.
Slide 11 only has an image of a “return” key patriotically 
painted with the word VOTE.
Slide 12 blank Charles Johnson for president.
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